JIHADISTS’ CODE OF CONDUCT IN THE ERA OF ISIS

INTRODUCTION
The world has always viewed jihadism
with fear and apprehension, afraid of
its destabilizing effects both locally and
globally. While the rise of ISIS in its post-
2013 iteration changed how we perceive
jihadism, its abilities, and ambitions, it
also transformed how jihadists perceive
themselves and how they behave.
In the late 2000s, al-Qaeda seemed
to be on the ropes, with its network
suffering severe setbacks as a result
of liquidations, imprisonment, and a
lack of theaters of conflict. In an effort
to change how it was perceived, al-
Qaeda’s leadership initiated an internal
reform process that aimed to win the
hearts and minds of people. To do this,
Osama bin Laden wrote in internal
letters, the group did not need to change
its beliefs, but it did need to change its
behavior, including limiting the number
of fronts on which it fought and avoiding
excessive violence.
Evidently ISIS did not heed bin Laden’s
advice when, in 2013-14, the renegade
group embarked on a campaign of
brutality and terror against all the
enemies it could identify — including
other jihadists. In September 2013 an
early response from al-Qaeda’s new
leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, entitled
General Guidelines for Jihadi Work, aimed
to convince ISIS of the error of its ways,
but to no avail. The following years were
characterized by an unprecedented
level of enmity and fragmentation within
the broader jihadi movement, prompting
jihadists opposed to ISIS to engage in
critical self-reflection.
This paper studies how three jihadist
groups, namely the Afghan Taliban,
al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent
(AQIS), and the Pakistani Taliban
(Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, or TTP),
responded. In the years 2017-18 each
issued internal guidelines, or codes of
conduct, to its fighters with the aim of
providing direction and correcting their
behavior. While this could be considered
a normal part of any organization’s
continuing evolution, these codes of
conduct should be read in the light of
the rise of ISIS and rival jihadists’ need
to distance themselves from the group.
AFGHAN TALIBAN
”Jihad is not an unlimited action or
audacious killing, but like every other
religious practice shari’a has set special
jurisprudence for jihad; by following only
that path and compliance with those
terms, orders, and instructions is the
possibility of actual jihad done. Like before
starting other worships, it is compulsory
to learn and understand their shari’a
instructions and manners. Similarly, before
anything a mujahid should understand
the important instructions and manners
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of jihad. These instructions are presented
to the mujahedeen from the leader of
Islamic Emirate Amir al-Momineen Mullah
Haibatullah Akhundzada. The mujahedeen
should try to read these instructions,
understand them, and act accordingly.”
Haibatullah Akhundzada, “Guidance to
the Mujahideen,” Taliban’s Commission
for Cultural Affairs, May 2017
The Afghan Taliban was the first of the
three groups to publish an internal
guidance document. In May 2017,
its leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada,
published a lengthy document —
totaling approximately 130 pages —
entitled Guidance to the Mujahedeen.
The organization printed 5,000 copies
and distributed them among Taliban
members and supporters alike.
Haibatullah’s background as a religious
scholar is evident throughout the
document, which is mainly a compilation
of Quranic references and hadith used to
exemplify and support specific themes.
In contrast to the documents put out
by AQIS and the TTP (discussed below),
Haibatullah’s tone is much less direct
and his guidance does not come in the
form of orders, but rather as advice on
good behavior. The document primarily
discusses abstract issues such as
sincerity in intentions, piousness, and
morals, but the most intriguing section
is that on authority, discipline, and
unity. Haibatullah writes that power and
authority lie in religion and in the position
of amir (leader). Writing that “Obedience
to the shari’a amir is obligatory,” he
attempts to instill respect for his position,
which had been challenged both by
dissatisfied Taliban members and by
dissidents who left to join ISIS’s local
branch, the Islamic State – Khorasan
Province (ISKP). He warns about the
responsibility that accompanies power,
as well as the greed that may consume
those who pursue it. Since dissidents
who left the Taliban or the TTP to join
ISKP were often rewarded with positions
of power in the new group, Haibatullah’s
comment is likely a thinly-veiled critique
of those seeking power for its own sake,
without true qualifications.
On discipline, he emphasizes that moral
behavior must be grounded in religion
and offers the issue of prisoners — a
recurring theme in all three documents
— as an example. Prisoners should be
treated well and in accordance with
shari’a. While shari’a permits killing
certain categories of prisoners, it is not
mandatory as they can also legitimately
be exchanged for imprisoned Muslims
or used to extract ransom. ISIS has
become infamous for beheading
prisoners and publicizing pictures or
videos of the executions. While the
widespread publicity these executions
gained likely played an important role
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in the West’s decision to intervene
militarily against ISIS, it is also clear
that they tarnished the reputation of
Islam on the global stage — which
is a concern for the Taliban and
likeminded groups.
The issue of unity is arguably the
most important. ISIS’s rise to global
prominence, its rebellious nature,
and bellicose attitude toward other
jihadi groups have resulted in an
increasingly fragmented jihadi
movement and a normalization
of intra-jihadi infighting. Over the
years, the Taliban has proved to be a
pragmatic group that has strived to
facilitate alliances and collaboration
as opposed to disunity. Thus, it comes
as no surprise that Haibatullah writes,
“It is obligatory for mujahedeen to be
united, harmonized, and disciplined
in their works. … Mujahedeen
shouldn’t have disagreements in a
matter; if any differences emerge,
these will be either regarding shari’a
or political matters. They should
consult Islamic scholars for shari’a
matters and for political matters
should refer to their respective
amirs.” This not only establishes
that internal disagreements, not to
mention actual infighting, should
be avoided, but it also identifies
mechanisms, albeit in vague terms,
to help manage potential conflict.
Haibatullah finishes the document
with a sort of checklist of 23 pieces
of advice, listed in bullets, to ensure
good manners among jihadists.
AL-QAEDA IN THE
INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
(AQIS)
“The major objectives of issuing the
Code of Conduct are as follows:
Putting forward for the mujahedeen
of AQS [AQIS] the scope of their jihadi
work, to prevent them from un-Islamic
operations, and to keep them from
attacking even those targets that are
permissible in shari’a, but at the same
time are either harmful or not beneficial
for the jihadi movement. Extending a
sincere invitation to all mujahedeen
active in the battlefield of jihad to
get on the same page and unite and
synchronize their efforts in the selection
of their targets, and in their modus
operandi.”
AQIS, “Code of Conduct”, As-Sahab
Media, June 24, 2017
Afghan Taliban militants take to the street to celebrate a
ceasefire in Jalalabad on Hune 16, 2018.
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Al-Qaeda’s newest affiliate, AQIS, was
established in September 2014, likely in an
attempt to ensure a long-term al-Qaeda
presence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region
in the face of the emerging challenge from
ISIS. On June 24, 2017, the group’s as-Sahab
Media Foundation issued a comprehensive
code of conduct document in four different
languages: Arabic, Bengali, English, and
Urdu. It is hard not to see the guidelines
as a reaction to changes in the militant
environment resulting from the rise and
actions of ISIS.
Compared to those of the Afghan Taliban
and TTP, the AQIS code of conduct is
arguably the most elaborate. It carefully
details the scope and limits of group
behavior, identifies and prioritizes the
group’s enemies, and explains how they
can be targeted. It also outlines why certain
enemies — despite being legitimate targets
under shari’a — should not be targeted.
As such, the document aims primarily to
establish a hierarchy of authority between
jihadi groups in the region and to protect the
image of jihad from ISIS’s efforts to distort it.
While AQIS is an official affiliate of al-Qaeda
and thus under the authority of Zawahiri, it is
also subservient to the Afghan Taliban. AQIS
fighters fight in the ranks of the Taliban and
declare their allegiance to both its amir and
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that of al-Qaeda. The document argues
that this should be the case for all jihadi
groups in the region, as such a hierarchical
structure would ensure cohesion within
the broader jihadi movement. This
aligns with Zawahiri’s emphasis on jihadi
unity and identification of the Taliban as
the symbolic center of authority. The
document identifies the Taliban amir as
the region’s leading authority, clearly
challenging the ISKP and its allegiance
to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of
ISIS, who remains an outsider in the eyes
of most militants in South Asia.
The code of conduct is especially
focused on setting out guidelines for
military operations on both a strategic
and tactical level. Echoing the al-
Qaeda leadership, it stresses that the
group should not engage in peripheral
battles. For example, the code states
that the Shi’a, whom the group consider
unbelievers, should not be targeted
unless they actively fight Sunnis.
Similar reservations were forwarded
by Zawahiri and other senior al-Qaeda
figures to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ISIS’s
founding figure, back in 2005. According
to AQIS, this measure aims to “avoid
all such military operations that are
beyond the understanding of common
Muslims or repulse them away from the
mujahedeen.”
On a tactical level, it prohibits any attack
in public where there is a risk of “hurting
common Muslims.” Even attacks
against symbols of polytheism, such
as tombs and shrines, are considered
impermissible as such shirk (polytheism)
should be countered through dawa
(proselytization), meaning through
words and not violence. This is in
stark contrast to ISIS’s indiscriminate
brutality. Throughout the document,
AQIS attempts to portray itself as the
defender of Muslims. If any transgression
is carried out against a Muslim, the
group should issue an apology and the
perpetrators be held accountable while
diyah (blood money) will be offered to
the victims. Even in cases where ordinary
Muslims fight against the mujahedeen,
the objective should be to avoid conflict.
The document stresses that sensitive
topics, such as declaring somebody
an unbeliever, are only for the group’s
‘ulama (religious authorities) and that
regular members are prohibited from
discussing such matters.
Interestingly, the AQIS code of conduct
also contains a section on ties with
other jihadi groups, which it generally
describes in fraternal terms. It promotes
an “environment of mutual constructive
criticism” and a process of internal
reform to correct any potential mistakes.
To achieve this, it advises all other jihadi
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groups in the region to pledge allegiance
to the Taliban as a way of uniting groups
and ensuring a coherent strategy.
TEHREEK-ETALIBAN
PAKISTAN
(TTP)
“Since the goal of Tehreek-e Taliban
Pakistan is to implement the code of
life given by Allah in the individual and
social life of Muslims and to defend from
enemies attacking the religion and lands of
Muslims under the guidance of Islamic law,
therefore the structure of Tehreek-e Taliban
Pakistan must be an Islamic one and every
member of the Tehreek is obliged that,
after being Muslim, his character, attitude,
lifestyle, and his struggle must also be
according to the Islamic code of conduct. …
In these guidelines it is tried to envision the
destination of Tehreek because travelers
with a goal do not go astray. A movement
whose goal is not clear usually runs into
chaos during its journey and falls apart
while deviating from the right path.”
Tehreek-e-Taliban, “Operation Manual
for Mujahideen of Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan,” Umar Media, September 2018
In September 2018, the TTP, known
as the Pakistani Taliban, issued a 13-
page operational manual to its fighters,
published in both Urdu and in English
on its website and distributed through
Telegram channels. While the manual
is, on the one hand, an attempt by the
group’s newly appointed leader, Mufti
Noor Wali Mehsud, to impose his authority
after the death of the charismatic Mullah
Fazlullah, it also functions, on the other,
as an effort to rebrand and reform the
group to counter the challenge from
ISKP. Around the same time, the group
unveiled a new flag that resembled
the ISIS banner, but in reverse colors
with a white background, similar to that
of the Taliban. While some analysts
understood this to be a move toward
ISIS, it is more accurately perceived as a
way to challenge its rival while showing
its affiliation to the Afghan Taliban.
The TTP is arguably suffering the most
from ISIS’s emergence and declaration
of a caliphate, especially in terms of
defections. In 2014-15, hundreds of TTP
fighters shifted their allegiance, and
among them were many senior figures
who now comprise the backbone of
ISKP, including Hafez Saeed Khan (the
first ISKP amir), Abdul Rahman Ghaleb
(the third ISKP amir), and Shahidullah
Shahid (late ISKP spokesperson). Hence,
the TTP has great incentives to counter
ISIS — a reality made clear from the
operational manual’s themes and its
presentation of them not as guidelines,
but as laws whose strict adherence is
imperative.
Pakistan Taliban members, part of the committee nominated
to hold talks with the Pakistan government, speak to media in
Akora Khattak in 2014. (BASIT SHAH/AFP/Getty Images)
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The two central themes in the manual are
strategic concerns and internal discipline
and unity. On a strategic level, the manual
stresses the necessity of reducing the
number of enemies the group is actively
fighting, echoing the al-Qaeda leadership’s
own guidelines. The manual then defines
legitimate targets, a category which
excludes other religious actors, apostate
sects (unless they actively fight the TTP),
and education and health care institutions.
This is a significant change of course
from previous practices. The group’s
policy regarding suicide operations also
changed drastically to align with the
recommendations offered by senior al-
Qaeda figures back in 2010. According to
the new policy, suicide operations should
only be carried out against highly important
targets and are subject to decisions by the
group’s military council or shura. No suicide
operations should be carried out in public
places like markets. Furthermore, if these
rules are not followed, those responsible for
the attack will be punished. This categorizes
suicide operations as a last resort, similar to
the views of al-Qaeda and Abu Muhammad
al-Maqdisi, the influential jihadi ideologue.
In terms of internal discipline, the manual
states that fighters should be obedient to
their amir both in military and theological
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affairs. If a conflict erupts, internal
reconciliation mechanisms should
be put in place on the local, regional
(regulatory shura), and national
(supreme shura) levels to address
the issue. Disputants are to be
divided among other factions of the
group and cannot hold a position
of responsibility. Fighters are
furthermore prohibited from having
any contact with people or groups
that differ in ideology from the TTP,
while fighters who already left the
group but want to rejoin must appeal
to its supreme shura to decide.
CONCLUSION
Since early 2014, many jihadi groups
around the world have suffered
from the emergence of ISIS as a
global phenomenon. Battling the
organization militarily, these groups
also must establish ways of ensuring
their own stability and protecting the
integrity of the religious and political
projects for which they are fighting.
The three strategic documents, or
codes of conduct, issued by the
Afghan Taliban, the AQIS, and the TTP
between 2017 and 2018 are of great
interest as they represent serious
efforts by these three groups to adapt
and correct internal and external
behavior in response to a changing
global and regional view of jihadism.
In the case of the Afghan Taliban and
the TTP, where new leaders were
recently appointed, the documents
are part of an effort by these leaders
to make a mark on their followers.
However, considering the timing of
the documents and recent events in
the region, it is hard not to interpret
them also as a direct response to the
threat and challenge from ISIS.
Both Taliban groups have suffered
critically from defections to ISKP
and the guidelines are thus a useful
instrument to lay out the differences
between the groups, how current
members should behave, and how
they can expect to be treated should
they defect. The TTP has historically
been chastised for its indiscriminate
violence, which, to some extent,
resembles that of ISIS. Thus, in the
aftermath of mass defections, the
new leadership found it imperative
to moderate the group’s tactics and
align it more closely with al-Qaeda
and the Afghan Taliban.